[lug] newbie question - rc.sysinit

[rm at mamma.varadinet.de]

On Fri, Jul 13, 2001 at 05:14:31PM -0600, Chris Riddoch wrote:
> <snip>
> 
> Having followed this, and a couple other threads for a while, the idea
> of having signatures on kernel modules sounds almost feasable, except
> for a couple problems...
> 
> Someone with root access can look at any area of memory or the hard
> drive.  The private key has to be kept somewhere... and the
> passphrase, too, if you expect modules to be able to autoload without
> the administrator sitting in front of the keyboard.
> 
> Seems that the best way to really be secure about this would be to
> build a kernel *without* module support.  Is anybody quite sure that
> this would completely remove the ability to add modules?

I actually use this as a policy for "highly exposed" machines.
For any kind of server outside a secured network i try very hard
to avoid loadable module support. Given the fact that most of these
boxes usually server e specific purpose i can live without modules.


> Even then, I suppose, the infinitely-capable adversary could
> binary-patch the kernel's area of memory while it's running. Heh.

Yes, indeed. Iff you need a box that's imune against such kinds of
attacks you might want tolook at NSAs version of Linux (i heard a 
lot of possitive remarks about it lately).

 Ralf