[lug] securing files
Hugh Brown
hugh at vecna.com
Mon Apr 22 21:16:02 MDT 2002
I was wondering what kind of solutions might be out there. If it turned
out that there was a quick and easy tool that I was ignorant of, it made
it worth asking the question. In any event, I have been educated about
some half solutions and can poke around at NSA Linux/SELinux.
Hugh
On Mon, 2002-04-22 at 22:28, Bear Giles wrote:
> > Right now they are on an NFS share. I'd like to make it so that the
> > files can't be copied anywhere but can still be read by the appropriate
> > people.
>
> This sounds like "mandatory access control (MAC)." NSA Linux may have
> it now, but probably doesn't. The way it works is the file system
> maintains some extra bits (e.g., do-not-copy, do-not-print,
> print-only-with-security-banner, etc. and all applications honor these
> bits).
>
> But I don't think any COTS OS supports MAC. The problem is the standard
> access control (including ACLs) and discretionary access control (DAC)
> can be implemented in the OS, while MAC requires that every application
> also be well behaved. That's possible in a tightly constrained environment,
> but not COTS software.
>
> This level of paranoia is appropriate if the data getting out could
> reasonably result in a few hundred million deaths. Somehow I doubt
> you're dealing with equally sensitive material.
>
> So what's the real story here? Why are you looking for a technical
> solution to the "no copy" policy, instead of relying on standard
> management tools like NDAs, bad performance reviews and possibly even
> termination of people to don't follow policy?
>
> Bear
Mainly privacy concerns, federal requirements, and agreements that we
have signed.
I was wondering what kind of solutions might be out there. If it turned
out that there was a quick and easy tool that I was ignorant of, it made
it worth asking the question. In any event, I have been educated about
some half solutions and can poke around at NSA Linux/SELinux.
Hugh
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