[lug] good place to park or sell domains?

[Robert Racansky]

On Wed, Feb 15, 2012 at 5:22 PM, Bear Giles <bgiles at coyotesong.com> wrote:
> Wikipedia says that a TRO doesn't always require advanced notice if there's
> reason to believe the other party will act to frustrate the court. E.g.,
> hiding assets before they can be documented. I guess he could have made a
> hypothetical argument that Robert would have sold the domain the moment he
> got notice of the court date but that's very inconsistent with Robert's
> other statements.
>

Mr. Hunt's argument was that he was was "entitled to a temporary
restraining order to prevent real, immediate, irreparable harm, and
unless Mr. Racansky is enjoined, immediate and irreparable injury,
loss or damage has and will continue to occur due to his tortious
conduct."  ("Motion", paragraph 9), and since he had "no plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy at law" ("Motion", paragraph 12) -- ie, a
trial will not take place for 6 months to a year -- that a Temporary
Restraining Order was necessary as soon as possible to take down the
web site www.JonahHunt.com


The six criteria for a such a Temporary Restraining Order in Colorado
that Judge Mulvahill had to consider are  ( see, Rathke v. MacFarlane,
648 P.2d 648 (Colo. 1982). at
http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=12927239079369594706 ):


In exercising its discretion, the trial court must find that the
moving party has demonstrated:

    (1) a reasonable probability of success on the merits, Combined
Communications Corp. v. Denver, 186 Colo. 443, 528 P.2d 249 (1974);
O'Connell v. Colorado State Bank, 633 P.2d 511 (Colo.App.1981);

    (2) a danger of real, immediate, and irreparable injury which may
be prevented by injunctive relief, American Investors Life Insurance
Co. v. Green Shield Plan, Inc., 145 Colo. 188, 358 P.2d 473 (1960);

    (3) that there is no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at law,
American Investors Life Insurance Co. v. Green Shield Plan, Inc.,
supra;

    (4) that the granting of a preliminary injunction will not
disserve the public interest, American Television and Communications
Corp. v. Manning, supra;

    (5) that the balance of equities favors the injunction, Combined
Communications Corp. v. Denver, supra; and

    (6) that the injunction will preserve the status quo pending a
trial on the merits, Combined Communications Corp. v. Denver, supra;
Graham v. Hoyl, 157 Colo. 338, 402 P.2d 604 (1965); Rivera v. Civil
Service Commission, 34 Colo.App. 152, 529 P.2d 1347 (1974).

See generally Macleod v. Miller, supra; Leubsdorf, The Standard for
Preliminary Injunctions, 91 Harv.L.Rev. 525 (1978); 11 Wright and
Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, §§ 2947-48 (1973). As
prerequisites, these criteria must be satisfied prior to granting
preliminary injunctive relief to enjoin the enforcement of a criminal
statute. If each criterion cannot be met, injunctive relief is not
available.